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Reshuffling the Injured Worker's Rights Against Third
Parties: One Step Forward--One Step Back
Edward J. Walters, Jr.*
Due to the greatly reduced nature of workers' compensation benefits as
compared to actual compensatory damages, the injured employee is ever searching
for someone other than his employer who may be at fault and thus, responsible for
his injuries and liable to him for full damages.
The "Great Compromise" of the 1914 Workers' Compensation Act authorized
these "third party actions" under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1101 which today
states, in pertinent part, as follows:
When an injury or compensable sickness or disease for which
compensation is payable under this Chapter has occun.:ed under
circumstances creating in some person (in this Section referred to as "third
person") other than those persons against whom the said employee's rights
and remedies are limited in R.S. 23:1032, a legal liability to pay damages
in respect thereto .... the payment or award of compensation hereunder
shall not affect the claim or right of action of the said employee ...
against such third person ... and such employee ... may obtain damages
from or proceed at law against such third person to recover dimages for
the injury, or compensable sickness or disease.'
Problems occur, however, when the party alleged to be at fault is the worker's
direct employer or statutory employer. The reshuffling of the respective rights and
responsibilities between the injured worker and these entities has produced a
regularly recurring tug-of-war between the legislature and the Supreme Court.
I. KIRKLAND: ONE STEP FORWARD
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Kirkland v. Riverwood International
U.S.A., Inc.2 expands the rights of an employee seeking recovery for an on-the-
job injury. A brief look at the steps taken to reach the decision in Kirkland will
be helpful.
A. Thibodeaux: The Birth of the Statutory Employer Defense
A "Statutory Employer" is immune from suit by an injured worker. The
statute giving rise to the "Statutory Employer" defense is purportedly found in
Copyright 1997, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Partner, Moore, Walters, Shoenfelt & Thompson, Baton Rouge, Louisiana and Adjunct
Professor of Law, LSU Law Center.
1. La. R.S. 23:1101 (Supp. 1996).
2. No. 951830, 1996 WL 523694 (La. Sept: 13, 1996).
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the language of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1061, which has remained
virtually unchanged since the adoption of the Workers' Compensation Act. It
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
When any person, in this Section referred to as the "principal,"
undertakes to execute any work, which is a part of his trade, business,
or occupation... and contracts with any person, in this Section referred
to as the "contractor," for the ececution by or under the contractor of
the whole or any part of the work undertaken by the principal, the
principal shall be liable to pay to any employee employed in the
execution of the work or to his dependent, any compensation under this
Chapter which he would have been liable to pay if the employee had
been immediately employed by him; and where compensation is claimed
from, or proceedings are taken against, the principal, then, in the
application of this Chapter reference to the principal shall be substituted
for reference to the employer ....
The rationale behind the statute was to prevent an employer from interposing
an impecunious independent contractor or sub-contractor between itself and its
injured employee in order to avoid compensation liability.. The statute thus
imposes compensation responsibility on an entity attempting such a ruse. Thus,
a new legal entity-the "principal"-was created. The principal was responsible
for the worker's compensation benefits if his contractors or subcontractors were
unable to provide these benefits to the injured worker. The sole purpose behind
the enactment was to protect the worker..
Nothing in the Act expressly provided, or even suggested, that a principal
was entitled to tort immunity, even if the principal actually had to pay
compensation benefits to an injured employee. In 1950, the Louisiana Supreme
Court, and not the Legislature, granted such tort immunity to a principal for the
first time. In Thibodaux v. Sun Oil Co., the court maintained an exception of
no cause of action that limited an injured employee's remedy against a principal
to workers' compensation. Absent from the opinion is any discussion of the fact
that there is not even a suggestion in Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1061 or
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032 of any grant of tort immunity to a principal,
or of a principal's apparent ability to avoid any compensation liability by
requiring its contractors to provide worker's compensation insurance for its
workers, or the question of whether immunity should be conferred only if a
principal actually pays compensation.
Thibodaux transformed Section 1061 from its intended purpose of protecting
an injured worker to a defense which, if successful, could leave fhe principal
3. La. R.S. 23:1061 (Supp. 1996).
4. 218 La. 453, 49 So. 2d 852 (1950).
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immune both in tort and worker's compensation. As stated in Wex S. Malone
& H. Alston Johnson, III, Workers' Compensation Law and Practice:5
It is one of the anomalies of Louisiana compensation law that an entire
group of persons or entities who may never actually pay compensation
to a claimant, or even be asked to do so, nonetheless enjoy complete
immunity from suit in tort by such a claimant.
The key inquiry in Thibodaux was whether the contract work: was part of the
putative principal's "trade, business or occupation" or "so closely related thereto
as to become an integral part thereof."6 Thus the birth of the "integral relation"
test, which was used to liberally construe tort immunity in favor of principals.7
In 1976, the Legislature added "principals" to the list of entities granted tort
immunity, thereby codifying the Thibodaux case. Section 1032 was amended to
read in part:
The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or his dependent
... shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of such employee
... against his employer, or any principal or any ... employee of such
employer or principal... *. For purposes of this Section, the word
"principal" shall be defined as any person who undertakes to execute
any work-which is a part of his trade, business or occupation in which
he was engaged at the time of the injury, or which he had contracted to
perform and contracts with any person for the execution thereof.8
B. Berry: Statutory Employer Clarified
The "intpgm reglali'ship" test was clarified in Berry v. Holston Well
Service, Inc.9 In Berry, the Louisiana Supreme Court criticized the "integral
relationship" test, noting that "[t]his almost limitless standard yielded inconsistent
and often illogical results since almost everything could be said to be integrally
related to the principal's trade, business or occupation."'" The Berry court
expressly abandoned the "integral relation" test and adopted a tcst "more in line
with the purpose of sections 1032 and 1061."" The court enunciated a three-
tier analysis for determining whether contract work is part of an alleged
principal's trade, business or occupation:
5. Wes S. Malone & H. Alston Johnson, i1, Workers' Compensation Law and Practice § 364,
in 13 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (3d ed. 1994).
6. 218 La. at 455, 49 So. 2d at 854.
7. Id.
8. La. R.S. 23:1032 (1985) (emphasis added).
9. 488 So. 2d 934 (La. 1986).
10. Id. at 937.
11. Id.
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1. Is the contract work specialized? Specialized work is, as a matter
of law, not a part of the principal's trade, business, or occupation, and
the principal is not the statutory employer of the specialized contractor's
employees.
2. Where the contract work is non-specialized, the court must compare
the contract work with the principal's trade, business or occupation. At
this second step, the court should make the following inquiries:
(i) Is the contract work routine and customary? That is, is it
regular and predictable?
(ii) Does the principal have the equipment and personnel
capable of performing the work?
(iii) What is the practice in the industry? Do industry
participants normally contract out this type of work or do they
have their own employees perform the work?
3. Was the principal engaged in the work at the time of the alleged
accient' 2
C. The 1989 Legislation: Statutory Employer Expanded or Restricted?
Apparently unhappy with Berry, the Legislature amended Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:1061 in 1989 to add the following sentence, which directly tracks
several of the factors enumerated in Berry:
The fact that work is specialized or nonspecialized, is extraordinary
construction or simple maintenance, is work that is usually done by
contract or by the principal's direct employee, or is routine or unpredict-
able, shall not prevent the work undertaken by the principal from being
considered part of the principal's trade, business, or occupation,
regardless of whether the principal has the equipment or manpower
capable of performing the work.'"
Was this an expansive change or a restrictive one? The majority of the
Louisiana appellate courts and the federal Fifth Circuit adopted the view that the
change was designed to overrule Berry and return to Thibodeaux's more liberal
"integral relation" test." There was no conflict in the Louisiana circuits until
the court of appeal's decision in Kirkland v. Riverwood International USA,
Inc.'
5
Commentators, however, correctly suggested that, even after the 1989
amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1061, "[olnly upon a thorough
12. Id. at 938.
13. La. R.S. 23:1061 (Supp. 1996).
14. 218 La. 453, 49 So. 2d 852 (La. 1950).
15. 658 So. 2d 715 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995).
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examination of the pre-Beny jurisprudence will the realization ifollow that a fact
based analysis has and always shall guide the inquiry. Nevertheless, the
uncertainty will continue until there has been a ruling on the test from
Louisiana's highest court.""
D. Kirkland's "New" Definition of Statutory Employer
The Louisiana Supreme Court accepted the Kirkland case and broadened the
test beyond that in Berry. In Kirkland, the defendant asserted that the plaintiff
was performing work that was an "integral part" of the putative principal's
"trade, business or occupation" so as to render the plaintiff a statutory employee
whose exclusive remedy was in workers' compensation. 7
As stated by the court in Kirkland,
[t]he starting point in our analysis is the statutory language of Section
1061, as amended in 1989. The amended section is silent as to the
standard to be applied for determining statutory employer status.
Nonetheless, given that the amendment closely tracks the factors this
court laid out in Berry, the Legislature obviously intended! to alter the
Berry test. The question thus becomes whether the Legislature, as the
federal appellate court and some of the state courts of appeal have held,
intended to overrule Berry and to return to Thibodaux's 'more liberal
integral relationship test, or whether the Legislature simply intended to
abrogate the rigid and mechanical application of the three-tiored analysis
set forth in Berry and return to the pre-Berry consideration of all
relevant factors in determining statutory employer status under the
totality of the circumstances.
The 1989 amendment does not prohibit the court's considering the
factors enumerated in Berry; the amendment merely proscribes making
any one of the factors conclusive of the determination of whether the
contract work was part of the principal's trade, business or occupation.
In effect, we interpret the 1989 amendment as intended to overrule
Berry, but not intended to overrule this court's decisions, in the ten
years preceding Berry, that the court was to consider all pertinent
factors under the totality of circumstances.
We therefore hold that the appropriate standard under the amended
Section 1061 for determining whether the contract work i:s part of the
alleged principal's trade, business or occupation is for -the court to
consider all pertinent factors under the totality of the circumstances. The
presence or absence of any one factor is not determinative, and the
16. Janice M. Church, Tort Immunity Revisited: What is the Presen:. Test for Statutory
Employer?, 54 La. L. Rev. 587, 598 (1994).
17. No. 95-1830, 1996 WL 523694, at 001 (La. Sept. 13, 1996).
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presence of one factor may compensate for the lack of another. Among
those factors to be considered in determining whether a statutory
employment relationship exists are the following:
(1) The nature of the business of the alleged principal;
(2) Whether the work was specialized or non-specialized;
(3) .Whether the contract work was routine, customary, ordinary or usual;
(4) Whether the alleged principal customarily used his own employees to
perform the work, or whether he contracted out all or most of such work;
(5) Whether the alleged principal had the equipment and personnel
capable of performing the contract work;
(6) Whether those in similar businesses normally contract out this type of
work or whether they have their own employees perform the work;
(7) Whether the direct employer of the claimant was an independent
business enterprise who insured his own workers and included that cost
in the contract; and
(8) Whether the principal was engaged in the contract work at the time of
the incident."8
The court thus broadened the test beyond that set forth in Berry, added several
variables to the test not included in Berry, held that the determination of whether
the contract work was part of the principal's "trade, business or occupation" is a
factual issue based on the "totality of the circumstances" to be resolved on a case-
by-case basis, and greatly reduced a defendant's opportunity to receive a summary
judgment on the issue of statutory employer.
A totality of the circumstances inquiry is frequently difficult to accomplish on
a motion for summary judgment, which requires a showing that there is no genuine
issue of material fact that would defeat entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
The decision in Kirkland, while not resulting in a true quidpro quo between
the injured worker and the immunity-seeking principal, makes the test of what is
the principal's "trade, business or occupation" more expansive and thus more
beneficial to the injured worker seeking recovery from the principal. It is doubtful
that Kirkland will survive the 1997 legislative session unscathed.
II. CLOSING THE CAVALIER DOOR: ONE STEP BACK
In a large number of workplace accidents, the worker's employer, along with
a "third party," is alleged to be partially at fault in causing the worker's injury.
As David Robertson stated in his book, The Louisiana Law of Comparative
Fault: A Decade of Progress:
By the great weight of authority under article 2324 as it stood before
the 1987 amendment, it was improper to assign a percentage of fault to
the plaintiff's employer. The reasoning was straightforward: The
18. Id. at 017-8.
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employer could not be held liable to the plaintiff for contribution, so
that its fault was simply irrelevant. To reduce the plaintiff's recovery
in an amount reflecting a percentage of fault allocted to the employer
would be fuicnctionally equivalent to imputing the employer's negli-
gence to the plaintiff, an unwarrantable outcome... Eecause the
employer's fault could have no legitimate impact on the rights of
plaintiff, defendant, or intervenor, the courts concluded employer fault
should be kept out of the case.' 9
In Cavalier v. Cain's Hydrostatic Testing, Inc.," the court outlined the
legislative history of how, with the advent of comparative fault, quantification
of employer fault arrived on the legal scene:
Prior to the advent of comparative fault, quantification of the fault of
these parties ... was never an issue. In the case of joint tortfeasors
each was liable to the plaintiff for the whole of the plaintiff's damages,
and contribution among joint tortfeasors was by equal portions
according to the number of tortfeasors.'
Any fault on behalf of the worker's employer was not coniidered. As the
Cavalier court noted, "if the plaintiff was at fault, recovery was totally barred
regardless of the plaintiffs degree of fault."'
Now, under comparative fault principles, negligence by the plaintiff of less
than one hundred percent merely reduces the amount of his recovery. The
amended Louisiana Civil Code article 2323 simply provided thai: the contributory
negligence, instead of defeating recovery, would only reduc,. the amount of
damages in proportion to the "degree or percentage of negligence attributable to
the person suffering the injury, death or loss.3'2
Cavalier further held:
In the same 1979 act, the Legislature also amended former La.Code
Civ.Proc. art. 1811 relative to special verdicts. The amended Article
1811 B required the court, in cases to recover damages for injury, death
or loss, to submit written questions to the jury inquiring as to the
causation and degree of fault of each party defendant and, "[i]f
appropriate, whether another involved person... was at fault," as well
as that person's causation and degree of fault.
Article 1812C does not expressly require quantification of the fault of
employers or of any non-parties. Rather, Article 1812C(2) permits
19. David Robertson, The Louisiana Law of Comparative Fault: A Decade of Progress 51 (1991).
20. 657 So. 2d 975 (La. 1995).
21. Id. at 979.
22. Id. at 976.
23. La. Civ. Code art. 2323.
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quantification of the fault of "another person, whether party or not," if
such quantification is appropriate. The term "[if appropriate," used in
both Article 1812C(2) and 1812C(3), clearly means if there is evidence
from which reasonable minds could conclude "another person" or the
plaintiff was at fault. However, since the Legislature did not specify
which non-parties should have their fault quantified by the jury, the
appropriateness, and indeed the necessity, of quantifying the fault of a
particular non-party as a substantive requirement of the overall statutory
scheme of comparative fault is inherently a question to be decided by
the courts.2 4
In Guidry v. Frank Guidry Oil Co.,2  the court first considered the question
of whether to quantify the fault of non-parties. In Guidry, the jury had
quantified the fault of the plaintiff's employer. The court discussed the fact that
there was no statutory requirement for quantifying comparative fault of
employers and declined to include employers as non-parties whose fault was
appropriate for quantification.26
Guidry was later overruled by Gauthier v. O'Brien." Noting that quantify-
ing the employer's fault pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
1812C will "serve to implement Louisiana's comparative fault scheme," the court
concluded that "the last sentence of (La. Civ. Code art. 2324B] suggests that
fault will be allocated to immune employers . "..."28 Overruling Guidry, the
court held that Article 2324B made the quantification of employer fault
mandatory.
The Cavalier court disagreed:
While employers cannot be joined as defendants or third party defen-
dants, there is no compelling reason ... that makes it necessary or
appropriate to require quantification of employer fault. Moreover,
employers not only are immune from liability in the third party action
by virtue of the compensation bargain, but also are granted a lien on the
employee's recovery against third parties. If employer fault were
quantified, the tort victim not only would suffer a reduction in the
percentage of tortfeasor fault available for recovery, but also would
suffer an additional reduction because of the priority of the at-fault
employer's statutory lien on the recovery proceeds which now are
reduced from one hundred percent to fifty percent from any one of
multiple tortfeasors.
24. 657 So. 2d at 979-81.
25. 579 So. 2d 947 (La. 1991).
26. Id. at 954.
27. 618 So. 2d 825 (La. 1993).
28. Id. at831.
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We conclude that while quantification of the fault of a non-party
settling tortfeasor is entirely appropriate and was probably contemplated
by La.Code Civ.Proc. art. 1812C, quantification of the fault of an
employer is not necessary or appropriate under Article 1812C in an
action against a third party tortfeasor.
We reconsider and reject the holding in Gauthier relative ito mandatory
quantification of employer fault. Neither the pre-1987 nor the post-
1987 version of Article 2324B requires the quantification of employer
fault.
The mention in the last sentence of Article 2324B of a joint tortfeasor's
"immunity" as one of the factors that does not increase another joint
tortfeasor's liability from joint to solidary certainly is not indicative of
a legislative intent to make quantification of employer fault mandatory.
Indeed, the last sentence of Article 2324B, in referring to the immunity
of certain persons (perhaps certain family members whom the plaintiff
cannot sue, but who may be joined in the action by third party demand
for contribution), does not suggest, one way or the ot~her, whether
quantifying employer fault is necessary or appropriate in the overall
comparative fault system. We therefore overrule thte holding of
Gauthier that quantification of employer fault either is suggested by
La.Code Civ.Proc. art. 1812C or is made mandatory by La.Civ.Code art.
2324B.9
Cavalier lived barely a year. In 1996, Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1104
was amended to read as.follows:
In a suit brought pursuant to R.S. 23:1101, the fault of persons immune.
from suit in tort under R.S. 23:1032 shall be assessed as a percentage
of the aggregate fault of all persons causing or contributing to the
employee's injury, and the fault so assessed shall not be reallocated to
any other person or party. The recovery had in such a suit by the
employer or any other person having paid or having become obligated
to pay compensation shall be reduced by the fault so assessed. This
reduction is in addition to but not duplicative of any reduction made
pursuant to Civil Code Articles 2323, 2324, and 2324.2 and R.S.
23:1101(B)."0
The legislature also amended Civil Code article 2323(A) to require a
determination of the degree or percentage of fault of all persons causing or
contributing to the injury, death, or loss "regardless of whether the person is a
29. 657 So. 2d at 982-84.
30. La. R.S. 23:1104 (as enacted by 1996 La. Acts No. 15).
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party to the Action or a nonparty, and regardless of the person's insolvency,
ability to pay, immunity by statute, including but not limited to the provisions of
R.S. 23:1032, or that the other person's identity is not known or reasonably
ascertainable... ."31
In addition, Code of Civil Procedure article 1812(C) was amended to require
a mandatory allocation of fault to immune entities such as an employer, as
follows:
Art. 1812. Special Verdicts
C. In cases to recover damages for injury, death, or loss, the court at
the request of any party shall submit to the jury special written
questions as to
(2)(a) If appropriate under the facts adduced at trial, whether another
party or non-party, other than the person suffering injury, death, or loss,
was at fault, and if so (i) whether such fault was a legal cause of the
damages, and, if so (ii) the degree of such fault express in percentage.
(b) For purposes of this Paragraph, non-party means a person alleged
by any party to be at fault, including but not limited to (i) a person who
has obtained a release from liability from the person suffering injury,
death, or loss, (ii) a person who exists but whose identity is unknown,
or (iii) a person who may be immune from suit because of immunity
granted by statute."
The tug-of-war continues and only time will tell which end of the rope has
the most strength.
31. La. Civ. Code art. 2323 (as enacted by 1996 La. Acts No. 3).
32. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1812 (as enacted by 1996 La. Acts No. 65).
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